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Prospectus
NEW YORK CITY SCHOOL DECENTRALIZATION
I. Introduction
The 1969 New York Education Act' grew out of a movement
demanding decentralization of the New York City school system.
The ultimate goals of this movement were to: (1) encourage
community awareness and participation in the development of
educational policy, and (2) create sufficient flexibility in the
school system to enable administrators to resolve the diverse
needs of the varying communities within the city. 2 Support for the
plan arose out of more than a decade of dissatisfaction with the
centralized system by educators, school administrators, and par-
ents. 3 Supporters of decentralization had pointed in particular to
the failure of the centralized system to achieve racial integration
and to raise the achievement levels of black and Puerto Rican
students. 4 They also relied upon the findings of the Coleman
study,3 conducted under the auspices of the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare, to show the need for decentral-
ization.
6
The advocates of decentralization, largely representing minor-
ity group interests, maintained that the centralized school system
could never be responsive to the individual needs of all the
socio-economic groups in the City. A centralized system, it was
I N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590 (McKinney Supp. 1969), effective July 1, 1970.
2 Mayor's Advisory Panel on Decentralization of the New York City Schools, Reconnec-
tion for Learning, at ii, November 9, 1969.
31d., at I. See also M. BERUBE & M. GITTELL, CONFRONTATION AT OCEAN HILL-
BROWNSVILLE, 329 (1969).
4 BERUBE, supra note 3, at 3-13. The author points out that "nearly 85% of Harlem school
children are two years behind the norm at reading," at 3.
5 Coleman, Equality of Educational Opportunity. (Washington, D.C., United States De-
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare, Office of Education. 1966) Coleman's
study included schools throughout the United States. He found the educational level
of caucasians significantly higher than that of minority groups at comparable levels in
school. He also found, especially in the large cities, that students' belief in a sense of
control over their environment and a belief in the responsiveness of that environment
are the most important criteria in raising levels of achievement. He concluded that the
educational system must be changed so that it is responsive to the needs of minority
groups and that these groups must have some control over the system. Id., at 219 and
320-325.
6 Mayor's Advisory Panel, supra note 2, at 1I.
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argued, acts on a city-wide basis and is therefore not sensitive to
particular community problems, nor capable of solving them. By
decentralizing the system, control would pass to the communities,
which are more cognizant of the nature of the educational prob-
lems in their schools, and are better equipped to solve them. The
opponents of decentralization, mainly the middle class for whom
the centralized school system had been unobjectionable, claimed
however that the communities had little experience in running a
school system, and that this responsibility was best left in the
hands of professionals. Efficient and capable schools, they warn-
ed, could only exist under a centralized administration.
7
The backers of decentralization campaigned vigorously for
their cause. Reacting to the community and political pressure that
resulted, the New York City Board of Education, on October 20,
1966, announced its decision to experiment with decentralization
and community control in various City schools. Three demonstra-
tion districts were set up in 1967: Intermediate School 201, Two
Bridges, and Ocean Hill-Brownsville. Supporters of decentraliza-
tion also initially convinced the New York State Legislature of
the need to develop a decentralization program. In 1967, the
legislature authorized Mayor Lindsay to prepare and submit to it
a plan for the decentralization of the New York City schools.8
The result was the Bundy Plan.9 Opposed by the United Feder-
ation of Teachers, the New York City Board of Education, and
some school administrators as establishing too decentralized a
school structure, 10 the Bundy Plan failed to pass the legislature.
Instead, the legislature directed the New York City Board of
Education to submit its own plan for decentralization. 1' This plan
was completed in January 1969; it divided the City into 29 school
districts and established district school boards each with control
over teacher assignment and transfer, curriculum, and texts. Lo-
7 See generally BERUBE, supra note 3.
8 Laws of New York, 190th Session, Chapter 484, 1967.
9 Mayor's Advisory Panel, supra note 2. The Panel formulated the Bundy Plan. It recom-
mended the creation of from 30 to 60 autonomous local school boards, which were to
be given the power "to authorize the general courses of study and approve the
content.., to authorize and determine the textbooks to be used ... (and) to appoint
the supervisory, administrative, teaching, and other personnel;" see 77-78 of the
report.
10 BERUBE, supra note 3, at 15.
1 Marchi Plan, N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 2564 (McKinney Supp. 1968).
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cal control was restricted, however, by the qualification that a
central school board was "to promulgate educational standards
and minimum curriculum requirements for all schools and pro-
grams." ' 12 In the sensitive political climate following the Ocean
Hill-Brownsville controversy,13 many state legislators felt that the
Board of Education's plan also proposed too decentralized a
school structure for the legislature to accept. However, after
numerous compromises, the 1969 New York Education Act did
pass the State legislature. 14 This Act, the product of political
compromise, is a diluted version of the Board of Education's plan.
Political compromise notwithstanding, the New York Act rep-
resents a major change in the educational process arising from the
quest of minority groups for participation in the political process.
The controversy over decentralization, as part of the larger issue
of community self-determination, has spread to many of the large
urban centers. The effectiveness of the New York school de-
centralization should have considerable bearing on the outcome
of the decentralization movement elsewhere inasmuch as the oth-
er urban school systems closely resemble the New York situation
albeit on a smaller scale.
15
II. Prior Structure
The 1969 Act does, theoretically at least, alter the prior struc-
ture of the New York City school system. Under the prior educa-
tion law, 16 the New York City Board of Education was appointed
•12 Board of Education, Plan for Development of a Community School District System for
the City of New York, at 24(§ 7(a)(2) of the proposed statute), January 29, 1969.
13 Ocean Hill-Brownsville was one of the three decentralized districts under the city's
Board of Education experiment in decentralization. To some commentators the con-
troversy began when the local board entered the involuntary transfer of thirteen
teachers, five assistant principals, and one principal to headquarters for reassignment.
The United Federation of Teachers went on the first of what were to be three strikes
between May and October claiming the transfers were in violation of due process.
After these months of dissension, control was taken from the local board in Novem-
ber 1968, and placed in a state trusteeship. The nature of the conflict became in many
ways racial: black local board against Jewish teachers. Opponents of decentralization,
including the United Federation of Teachers, claimed the experiment in decentraliza-
tion was a resounding failure. See BERUBE, supra note 3.
14 N. Y. Times, May 2, 1969, at 42, col. I (city ed.).
1 5 See California Senate Bill 264 (1969), Massachusetts House Bill 5344 (1969), MICH.
COMP. LAWS §§ 388.171-177 (1969). The Michigan act, dealing with Detroit, bears
close resemblance to the New York Act, providing for elected local boards having
control over teacher assignment, curriculum, and spending, subject to guidelines
established by an elected central authority.
16 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2554 (McKinney Supp. 1966).
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by the Mayor and was vested with all powers within the school
system. The Board appointed, transferred, and fired the Superin-
tendent, the centralized administration, and the teachers; it au-
thorized the courses, approved their content, and determined the
texts; it prepared the budget; and it established basic school
policy. The Board was also authorized to establish local school
boards, but the local boards were to be "advisory only."'17 In
practice, the Board of Education dictated course, curriculum and
texts.18 Teachers were often assigned without regard to the needs
of the communities or to the teachers' capabilities to meet these
needs. 19 It was against this authority that the East Harlem par-
ents rebelled, by boycotting I.S. 201 in September 1966, demand-
ing decentralization and community control.20 The 1969 Act was
the product of this movement to change the centralized power
structure.
III. Major Provisions of the 1969 Act
Under the new Act, the central school board and the superin-
tendent will be retained, designated as the city board and the
chancellor. The city board will be composed of one elected repre-
sentative from each borough* and two representatives appointed
by the Mayor. 21 Thus, the city board will be largely an elective
rather than an appointive body. The board, in turn, appoints the
chancellor and may dismiss him for cause. 22 Between thirty and
thirty three local school districts, called community districts, are
to be created, each with a minimum of 20,000 children in average
attendance. 23 The community districts are to be formed on the
17 Id. § 2564, prior to Marchi Amendment, supra note 1I.
18 BERUBE, supra note 3, 327-329. See also ROGERS, 110 LIVINGSTON STREET, 271-285
(1968).
19 ROGERS, supra note 16, at 275-278; Mayor's Advisory Panel, supra note 1, at 4.
20 BERUBE, supra note 3, at 13.
21 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-b (McKinney Supp. 1969). The change from an appointed to a
largely elected board may change not only personnel on the central board but also the
approach of the central board to community control. Theoretically, an elected board
should feel greater responsibility for the desires of the community electorate. Regard-
less, whether the elected board will in fact respond to the desires for community
control is too uncertain to allow speculation.
22 Id. § 2590-h.
23 The actual creation of the districts will be made by an interim board prior to the election
of the first city board. This interim board will be composed of five members, each
Borough President appointing one. New York Session Laws, 1969, Chap. 330, § II.
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basis of such criteria as special educational needs of the commu-
nities, existing school and transportation facilities, convenience of
location, and heterogeneity of pupil population. 24 High schools,
special and vocational schools are not included in the plan be-
cause of the existing "comprehensive high school program" tak-
ing shape in the city.
2 5
A community board will be established in each community
district, 26 composed of members elected by the eligible voters of
each district. 27 Much of the power of the old central Board of
Education is ostensibly shifted to these community boards by the
1969 Act. The community boards will employ a community su-
perintendent to whom the board delegates "such of its adminis-
trative and ministerial powers as it deems appropriate. '28
However, the creation of this decentralized structure will not
necessarily decentralize power within the school system. The
important consideration is not the label "decentralization," but
the reality of community control. Control will ultimately reside in
that group which determines: (1) teacher appointments, (2)
course, curriculum and texts, (3) fiscal policy, and (4) basic school
policy. Although the Act does not delineate where the control lies
in all these cases, the provisions of the Act do provide sufficient
basis for reasonable speculation on the likelihood of community
control.
A. Teachers: Hiring, Firing and Transfer
Appointment of teachers is effectuated as follows: "Each com-
munity board shall appoint teachers for all schools and programs
under its jurisdiction who are assigned to the district by the
chancellor from competitive eligible lists." '2 9 These eligibility lists
24 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-b (McKinney Supp. 1969). In dividing the city into community
districts, the interim board may be able to affect the power base of community control
by merging segments of ghetto areas into surrounding areas. Such gerrymandering
might continue to deny black and Puerto Rican groups effective control over much of
their education.
25 Id. § 2590-h(l)(a). See also note 12, supra, at 23.
26 Id. § 2590-b(2) (a).
27 Id. § 2590-c(3). Eligible voters are those persons who are registered voters residing in
the community district and every parent of a child attending a school within the
district who is a citizen of the state, resident of New York City for 90 days, and 21
years of age.
2 8 1 d. § 2590-e(l).




are compiled by the Board of Examiners" ° and include only those
teachers who meet both the state and city requirements. Lists are
made periodically, but each list must be chronologically depleted
before a teacher may be selected from a later list. An exception is
made for those schools in the lower forty-five percent of the
system as determined on the basis of student achievement on
reading tests. For such schools, the community boards may ap-
point any teacher who has met the state teaching requirements
and has passed either the City teachers' examination or the Na-
tional Teachers' Examination, regardless of position or presence
on an eligibility list.31
The community board also controls retention of teachers. The
community board, following a hearing and a majority vote, may
transfer or dismiss a teacher for any substantial reason.3 2 This
decision, however, may be appealed by the teacher to the city
board, which can affirm, modify, or reverse the community
board.3
3
The 1969 Act differs from the Bundy Plan and the Board of
Education's plan in two respects. First, under the new Act, each
community district may assign only those teachers who have been
assigned to that district by the chancellor. There is no city-wide
selection as provided in the previous plans. While this is not true
of the schools in the special forty-five percent category, it seems
fair to conclude that these schools' freedom of choice will be
significantly limited after the bulk of teachers have already been
assigned. Second, whereas the earlier plans would have termi-
nated the general requirement of City tests for teachers and the
existence of the Board of Examiners, these are retained under the
new Act.
The impact of these two changes is difficult to predict. On the
one hand, the central authority (city board, chancellor) retains
much control over teacher assignments as well as continuing
control over teacher qualifications. On the other hand, those
30 Id. § 2590-j(3)(a)(I). The Board of Examiners prepares and administers examinations to
candidates for teaching and supervisory positions in the school system. The Board of
Examiners consists of five members appointed by the city board (formerly by the
Board of Education). Id. § 2569.
31 Id. §§ 2590-j(5)(b)(c).
32 Id. §§ 2590-j(7)(a), 2590-j(7)(b)(6).
33 Id. § 2590-j(7)(f).
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schools in the forty-five percent category, which can hire without
recourse to the eligibility lists, are also those which most desire
decentralized community control and are arguably those which
most need it; that is, the under-achieving, often predominantly
black and Puerto Rican, schools. Should the supply of teachers
be sufficiently great, or should these schools be given first choice
of all available teachers, the under-achieving schools may develop
a teaching force better adapted to their requirements. However,
the Act is somewhat unclear on the procedure to be followed for
teacher selection by the under-achieving schools, and thus it
remains to be seen whether this possibility will materialize.
B. Course, Curriculum, and Textbooks
Authority over course, curriculum, and textbooks remains
largely centralized. It is the chancellor's responsibility to "pro-
mulgate minimum educational standards and curriculum require-
ments."3 4 The city board shall "approve determinations of the
chancellor relating to course and curriculum requirements." 35 The
community boards are delegated the vague authority "to deter-
mine matters relating to the instruction of students. ' 36 This au-
thority includes the right to select textbooks and other instruc-
tional materials, conditioned upon the approval of the chan-
cellor. 37 It is within the discretion of the city board and the
chancellor to give the community boards considerable authority
in the selection of courses, curriculum, and texts, thereby
effecting greater community control. On the other hand, the city
board may so restrict this potential that local control will be no
greater than that experienced under the prior centralized system.
C. Budget
Budget estimates for the operation of a community board and
for the schools in its district are to be initially prepared by the
local superintendents subject to the approval of that community
board, rather than by the centralized authority under the previous
34 Id. § 2590-h(8).
35 Id. § 2590-g(I).
36 Id. § 2590-e(3).
37 Id. § 2590-e(3).
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system.3 8 The chancellor then reviews the estimates of the indi-
vidual districts and submits to the city board his recommenda-
tions and a total estimate for the entire City. The city board
reviews the chancellor's budget requests, makes its own modi-
fications, and then submits its budget request to the Mayor.
The city board is to allocate funds to the community districts
"on the basis of objective formulae established annually by the
city board." 3 9 The formulae shall "reflect the relative education
needs of the community districts to the maximum extent fea-
sible." 40 The community boards will have authority to develop
their own schedule of expenditures and to alter this schedule
without city board approval, provided that all changes are con-
sistent with the curriculum requirements and do not result in
liabilities greater than their funds.
Funds to finance experimental programs shall be allocated by
the city board according to the need of the area and the value of
the innovation. With regard to special, federal, state, and private
funds, "each community board may contract for and receive
funds to be transmitted to the city board and disbursed through
the chancellor." 4 1 The community boards may also contract with
government and private agencies, the city board and other com-
munity boards for appropriate purchases or services, subject to
the approval of the chancellor.
While it is true that the community boards will now, for the
first time, have a voice in determining the proper allocation of
funds, the city board is nevertheless much more than a central-
ized clearing house. The final budget must be approved by the
city board, and the criteria for allocation of funds to the districts
are prepared by it. The city board has the discretion to establish
formulae attuned to the special financial needs of particular areas
and to so allocate the funds. On the other hand, it may, in its
discretion, do no more than provide for the basic school needs of
all schools.
38 Id. § 2590-i(2). All statutory references under the subheading Budget are found in
§ 2590-i.
39 Id. § 2590-i(7).
40 Id.
41 Id. § 2590-i(14)(a).
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D. Basic School Policy
The formulation of basic school policy falls within the powers
of the chancellor, who must "promulgate such rules and regu-
lations as he may determine to be necessary or convenient to
accomplish the purposes of this Act, not inconsistent with the
policies of the city board."'42 The community boards also formu-
late policy as an adjunct of their authority to control and operate
all schools except high schools and vocational schools. Their
policy-making is restricted, however, by the requirement that
such control and operation must not be "inconsistent with the
policies established by the city board. '" 43 From this unclear de-
lineation of authority, it is important to recognize that the city
board ultimately has the power to control basic school policy.
The school rules and regulations are set by its employee, the
chancellor, and the programs of the community boards must not
conflict with the policies of the city board.
Moreover, the city board is the final adjudicator of all policy
disputes. For all such disputes, including those between commu-
nity board and teacher, and chancellor and community board, the
city board serves as an "appellate tribunal," with authority to stay
the enforcement of orders issued by the chancellor or community
boards, and the authority to issue final orders itself.44 To enforce
such orders, the city board may withdraw specific community
board powers and confer them upon the chancellor, or it may
suspend or remove an entire community board or any member
thereof.45 In short, a community board's control over local policy
is not very secure. The new Act gives the illusion of decentralized
decision-making in the formulation of basic school policy, with
the reality of a centralized authority.
IV. Conclusion
Although the new structure creates the potential for decentral-
ization, the actual degree of decentralization that will result is
difficult to predict. It is reasonable to conclude that ultimate
42 Id. § 2590-h(16).
43 Id. § 2590-e.
4 Id. § 2590-1(0 and 2).
- Id. § 2590-1(1).
[Vol. 3: 1
School Decentralization
control of the structure under the new system remains largely in
the hands of a central authority. The role of the new city board is
much the same as that of its predecessor, the Board of Education.
The communities have no authority at all in the important sphere
of administration of the high schools, special and vocational
schools. Nevertheless, the new Act vests sufficient discretion in
the city board and the chancellor to achieve genuine decentraliza-
tion. By allowing the community boards to set basic school pol-
icy, instead of hamstringing them with directives and regulations
from the chancellor or the city board, and by allowing the boards
maximum discretion in their use of funds, the city board and
chancellor can shift much of the administrative control to the
communities. By providing the communities with a choice of
teachers preselected for the qualities desirable in particular com-
munities, instead of arbitrarily placing teachers on the eligibility
lists, the city board and the chancellor can ensure that the com-
munities have a substantial opportunity to implement local con-
trol over the nature and quality of instruction. Likewise, by pro-
viding a broad range of courses, curriculum, and texts for commu-
nity selection, the city board and chancellor can channel control
over the content of education to the community boards. On the
other hand, through restrictive action in these areas and through
jealous retention of the powers of the central authority, the city
board and chancellor can retain the centralized system that pre-
ceded the 1969 Act and thus defeat the policy behind it.
- Barry D. Hovis
*[Ed. Note ] While this article was in press, a Federal District Court in New York held
unconstitutional those provisions of the 1969 Education Act which provided for
election of the city board. The court held that the election of one member to the
board from each of New York City's five boroughs violated the one-man, one-vote
doctrine inasmuch as the boroughs differed in population. N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1969,
at 1, Col. 4.
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